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OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS:
ENFORCEMENT OF WORKER RIGHTS
Louise Sadowsky Brock*
In a period of new employment laws, it is important to determine
how those laws are enforced, why enforcement of those laws is
sometimes limited and how enforcement can be improved. This
Note discusses the ways in which the theory of collective action
limits enforcement of three employee rights statutes: the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.
Enforcement mechanisms such as class action lawsuits, administrative agencies, employee participationgroups, and labor unions
represent potential methods of overcoming collective action problems. Each method has its benefits, and the three statutes must
be reformed to increase the availability of all four methods. Ultimately, however, employee participationgroups represent the best
means for improving enforcement.

Since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act' in
1935, Congress has passed a wide variety of legislation protecting workers, including a health and safety statute,2 a
statute requiring notification of plant closings and mass
layoffs,3 and a minimum wage and maximum hour statute.4
Despite the growing pool of federal legislation, many of the ills
addressed by these laws persist. One major reason for continuing violations is the absence of effective enforcement. Pinpointing the sources of such enforcement problems is difficult
because the nature of these problems varies depending on the
type of protection offered by the statute and the nature of the
statute itself. Nevertheless, by focusing on a few worker
protection statutes and one common source of inadequate
*
Attorney in the Labor & Employment Department of the law firm Dinsmore
& Shohl, LLP, in Cincinnati, Ohio. Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform, Volume 29, 1996. B.A. 1993, University of Illinois; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan Law School.
1.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
2.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 [hereinafter OSHA], 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
3.
The Worker Readjustment and Retraining Notification Act [hereinafter
WARNA], 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
4.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [hereinafter FLSA], 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
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enforcement of those statutes, several statutory reforms
emerge as possible means of improving enforcement of these
laws.
This Note focuses on the enforcement of the three statutes
mentioned above: the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970' (OSHA), the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act 6 (WARNA), and the Fair Labor Standards Act of
19387 (FLSA). As compared to the private rights created by
collective bargaining agreements, the rights created and
protected by these laws-a safe working environment, advance
notification of layoffs and plant closings, access to certain
types of information, and compensation guarantees-are public
rights! Public rights are those that, when provided to one
employee, are available to all employees, or at least to all
employees within statutorily defined categories.9 Because an
individual lacks sufficient incentive to obtain something that
someone else could obtain for her, it is difficult to mobilize
workers to seek assistance from government agencies or to
take legal action to ensure that employers comply with the
laws.
This lack of incentive leads to ineffective enforcement absent
collective action. Collective action involves "the choice by all
or most individuals of the course of action that, when chosen
by all or most individuals, leads to the collectively best outcome."1" Difficulties organizing collective action emerge, however, when an individual perceives her costs of participation
as outweighing her benefits. When the goal of collective action
is a public right, the self-interested, rational person will
choose not to participate in collective action if she knows that
she will benefit whether she participates or not. This "logic of
collective action"1' prevents workers from taking effective

5.
29 U.S.C. § 651. Throughout this Note, "OSHA" will serve as an abbreviation
for the Occupational Safety and Health Act. References to the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration will be made in full or shortened to "the Administration."
6.
29 U.S.C. § 2101.
7.
29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
8.
See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25
U.S.F. L. REV. 169, 173-74 (1991) (comparing union collective bargaining and
representation to the enforcement of public rights guaranteed to every individual
regardless of union membership).
9.
See infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
10.
Jon Elster, Rationality,Morality,and Collective Action, 96 ETHICS 136, 137
(1985).
11.
See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 9 (1982) (explaining that the logic
of collective action is based on the assumption that individual actions are motivated
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*individual action toward enforcement of these laws because
any benefit they gain will be shared by all employees, whether
the other employees assisted in the efforts or not. Consequently, mobilization problems are one likely reason for inadequate
enforcement of OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA.
This Note begins, in Part I, by briefly explaining collective
action and the factors affecting the likelihood of its occurrence.
Part II describes certain substantive statutory provisions of
OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA, especially the enforcement mechanisms that Congress has provided in each statute. These
mechanisms are then analyzed in light of collective action
problems that arise in attempting to take advantage of each
statutory provision. Part III examines four alternative enforcement mechanisms-class actions, agency action, employee
participation groups, and unions-and the efficiency of each
alternative in overcoming collective action problems. The Note
concludes with suggestions for reform.
The effectiveness of the first two alternative enforcement
mechanisms, class action lawsuits and agency action, is limited by individual workers' lack of incentive to bring lawsuits on
behalf of similarly situated employees or to notify agencies of
employer violations. Also, the Department of Labor lacks the
resources necessary to ensure complete. compliance with the
laws, whether through litigation or through administrative
procedures. Therefore, this Note first proposes amending
WARNA to include agency involvement that combines the
roles filled by the agencies under OSHA and FLSA.
This Note also proposes a new definition of the term
"representative" in both OSHA and WARNA to specifically
include employee representatives who have been selected by
the employees but who are not necessarily labor union
representatives. Such a reform should increase the effectiveness of both class actions and agency involvement as
enforcement mechanisms. FLSA should also be amended along
these lines to allow representatives to bring lawsuits on behalf
of employees, as allowed by WARNA. As with OSHA and
WARNA, this change should improve the effectiveness of class
actions.

by self-interest). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (arguing that rational, self-

interested individuals will not act to further group interests without coercion or other
incentives).
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The last two alternatives for improving enforcement
mechanisms, employee participation groups and unions,
function to increase the likelihood of individual employee
involvement. Both methods employ an internal representative
who can enforce statutes through administrative channels or
through litigation, on behalf of all employees. While this Note
recognizes the limitations of these two mechanisms, it argues
that they have the greatest potential for improving enforcement of OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA. Employee participation
groups and unions create opportunities for employees to
develop commitments to collective action, and they serve as
bridges connecting the work site to the relevant agency.
Because union coverage accounts for a decreasing segment of
the workforce, 2 employee participation groups may be the
most effective enforcement mechanism for the majority of
employees.

I. INDIVIDUAL ACTION VERSUS COLLECTIVE ACTION
Two distinct categories of rights are available to employees.
One group of rights is individual in nature and relates to how
a particular employee is treated by her employer and the
effects of such treatment on that employee. In these cases the
need for an organization to enforce rights diminishes because
the individual has enough incentive to advance her personal
interests. Mancur Olson argues that "personal or individual
interests can be advanced, and usually advanced most efficiently, by individual, unorganized action. There is obviously
no purpose in having an organization when individual, unorganized action can serve the interests of the individual as well
as or better than an organization . . . ."' For example, if a
worker has a contract with her employer and the employer
breaches the contract, the worker has an incentive to seek a
remedy for herself. Similarly, anti-discrimination laws protect
individual interests by providing individual remedies for

12.
Private-sector union density was 11.5 percent in 1993 and declining. See
Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representationin
a Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993).
13.
OLSON, supra note 11, at 7.
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employees whom an employer treats unfairly as compared to
similarly situated employees. 4
The second category of rights, public rights, accrue to
groups 5 of employees by providing benefits to all employees in
a particular company or industry. OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA
provide such benefits. These benefits-a safe working environment," notification of plant closings and mass layoffs,'1 7 minimum wages,'" and overtime pay 19 -are "public goods" because
they have two characteristics, namely jointness of supply and
impossibility of exclusion.20 Jointness of supply means that one
person's use does not reduce the amount available for everyone
else; impossibility of exclusion refers to the fact that an individual cannot prevent the group from consuming the good once
it is made available. 2 ' More simply, "public goods" are those
that cannot be provided to one person unless provided to all.2 2
The statutes discussed in this Note deal with public rights.
While these rights could be protected by either individual or
collective action, individual enforcement is unlikely because
employees lack the incentive to seek protection of these rights on
their own.2" The rational individual recognizes that if she puts
forth the time, effort, money, and risk to protect a collective good,
the benefit she gains for herself will be shared by all employees
affected by that law, while she bears the full cost of her effort.
Consequently, she may choose not to exert the effort, hoping
instead to enjoy the benefits when another individual acts. This
phenomenon is commonly known as free-riding.24

14.
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994 & Supp. I 1995)) (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion).
15.
The term "group" refers to "individuals with common interests." OLSON,
supra note 11, at 1.
16.
See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
17.
See WARNA, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
18.
See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
19.
See FLSA § 207.
20.
See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 17.
21.
See id.
22.
See Heidi Li Feldman, Note, Divided We Fall:Associational Standing and
Collective Interest, 87 MICH. L. REV. 733, 748 n.71 (1988).
23.
See OLSON, supra note 11, at 12 (explaining that a rational person in a large
organization does not think withholding his support will affect how others behave).
Lack of incentive for the individual to invest time or money is another reason
collective bargaining is necessary. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF,

WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 9 (1984). Another factor inhibiting individual action is fear of
retaliation. Id.
24.
See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 23, at 243 (explaining that "a free-rider
is a worker who enjoys all the benefits of unionism but does not pay dues for those

786

University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform

[VOL. 30:4

Collective action will likely protect the public rights created
by OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA more effectively than individual
action, but it presents its own difficulties.2 5 What incentives
will propel individuals into collective action? More specifically,
how much will an individual "pay" to obtain a collective good
that will be shared by others who choose to free-ride on the
gains? These "investments," or costs to the individual, may
take the form of money, time, and risk of employer retaliation.26 Workers will not make these investments if their
probable benefits are not greater than their costs, 2 7 and the
costs will often outweigh the benefits because of the public, or
collective, nature of the rights. "[A] catalyst is usually needed
for a group of individuals to shake the habits of a lifetime and
to assert themselves by taking advantage of the opportunities
provided by collective action; that is especially true when
those individuals are subject to economic reprisal."28 When
such a risk of retaliation looms large, and investment by other
employees is minimal, an individual worker has little incentive to seek enforcement of the law. This lack of incentive to
spend time and money and to take risks also prevents workers
from obtaining crucial information about their working conditions and their rights. 29 The combination of inadequate
information and disincentive to take individual action
prevents adequate enforcement of OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA.
One solution involves forming some type of organization or
designating a representative. An agent could further those
Shared interests which provide little or no incentive for individual pursuit.3 ° This solution, however, has limits of its own.

benefits"). This Note uses the term "free rider" more broadly than Freeman and
Medoff by applying it outside the union setting. Free riders include workers who
enjoy any benefits that flow from collective action without contributing to the
procurement of those benefits.
25.
See infra Parts II.A.2, B.2, and C.2 (discussing the collective action problems
associated with OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA).
26.
See supra note 23.
27.
See OLSON, supra note 11, at 35 (concluding that a group member will have
less incentive to help the collective effort if she gets a smaller benefit).
28.

AFL-CIO COMM. ON THE EVOLUTION OF WORK, 99TH CONG., THE CHANGING

SITUATION OF WORKERS AND THEIR UNIONS 7 (Comm. Print 1985).
29.
See infra text accompanying notes 76-87, 106-09, 124 (discussing the types
of information employees need to enforce OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA).
30.
See OLSON, supra note 11, at 46 (comparing groups in which one member gets
enough personal benefit that it is worth paying the full cost himself with groups in
which "no collective good can be obtained without some group agreement, coordination, or organization").
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Several factors affect the likelihood that an individual will
either serve as a representative or cooperate with organizational efforts. The first factor involves short-term versus
long-term cost-benefit analysis. The logic of collective action is
based on the assumption that individuals are motivated by
self-interest.3 Therefore, an individual faced with a choice
between action or inaction will analyze the costs and benefits
associated with each possible option. As a result, those who
stand to gain the most from a collective good will contribute
more to attaining that good.32 Furthermore, if an individual
anticipates additional future choices, where the future choices
are contingent upon a decision to participate now, she may
conclude that cooperation now will lead to additional benefits
later.33 Such cooperation serves as the catalyst for forming a
group, and from that point forward individual members may
demonstrate commitment to the group's collective aims beyond
self-interested personal gains. 4
A second factor affecting the likelihood of collective action is
the nature of benefits the group seeks to obtain. Russell
Hardin, a behavior researcher, distinguishes between "collective goods," which the group seeks to obtain, and "collective
bads," which the group seeks to eliminate.3 5 He concludes that
individuals are more motivated to rid themselves of a collective bad than to obtain a collective good. s Similarly, observers
of human behavior expect more cooperation to oppose a loss
than to fight for a gain.37 The rights protected by OSHA,
WARNA, and FLSA fit loosely into both of these categories.
For example, OSHA provides means for employees to rid themselves of dangerous working conditions, thereby eliminating a
collective bad.38 In addition, administrative enforcement under
OSHA creates safe and healthy working environments,39

31.
See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 9.
32.
See OLSON, supra note 11, at 22 (concluding that if one individual can obtain
enough of the benefit at a low enough cost, that individual will provide the collective
good single-handedly).
33.
See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 13; Elster, supra note 10, at 146.
34.
See Feldman, supra note 22, at 753.
35.
See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 50-66.
36.
See id. at 82-83.
37.
See id. at 62-64.
38.
See infra Part II.A. 1 (discussing the procedure for filing a complaint with the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
39.
See Basil J. Whiting, OSHA's Enforcement Policy, 31 LAB. L.J. 259, 259-60
(1980) (explaining that the statute is structured to provide deterrents to noncompliance).
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thereby obtaining a collective good for all workers. Under
WARNA, employees seek to procure -the collective good of
advance notice,4" and under FLSA, they seek wages and overtime pay.4 1
In summary, individual efforts are both unlikely and inadequate to enforce the rights protected by OSHA, WARNA, and
FLSA. Consequently, individuals must form a collective force
or seek the assistance of a representative willing to make the
necessary commitment. Once the group is formed or the
representative identified, its success will depend on continued
cooperation of individual group members, or principals of the
representative, as well as the nature of the collective benefit
sought.

II. ENFORCEMENT OF OSHA, WARNA, AND FLSA

OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA anticipate the need for group
enforcement, but various collective action problems interfere
with the initial formation of these groups. While the laws
anticipate enforcement by group representatives, these representatives may lack incentives or resources to obtain the
public rights protected by the statutes.

A. OSHA

The stated purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 197042 (OSHA) is "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources."4 3
Two of the thirteen means for achieving this purpose are
"providing an effective enforcement program" 44 and "providing
for appropriate reporting procedures ...which procedures will
help ... accurately describe the nature of the occupational

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See WARNA, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
Id. § 651(b).
Id. § 651(b)(10).
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safety and health problem."4" Enforcement mechanisms and
information thereby emerge as important tools for achieving
OSHA's goals.
Despite more than twenty-five years of existence, OSHA has
not adequately achieved its goals. The media has reported
several recent examples of persistent violations, some resulting in major casualties.46 One particularly egregious event
occurred in 1992 when a poultry plant fire in North Carolina
killed twenty-five workers and injured fifty-six others.47 The
Company posted warning signs long before the deadly event
transpired, but hazards such as locked doors, frequent fires,
grease and water on the floor, and overflowing toilets went
unreported for eleven years.48 Employees did not report the
conditions and injuries because of employer intimidation.49 In
addition to this one anecdote, an empirical study portrays a
dismal picture of OSHA's effectiveness in preventing workrelated injuries and diseases."0 Clearly, the entire workforce
must pursue more effective methods of enforcement and
reporting.
This Part discusses the OSHA enforcement mechanisms and
the collective action problems associated with those mechanisms. It then argues that the most apparent weakness in
enforcement is the lack of cooperation between the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (the Administration)
and individual employee representatives.
1. The Statutory Scheme-Collective action problems
hamper efficient functioning of several OSHA provisions.
These provisions require filing a complaint with the agency,
requesting an inspection, participating in the physical inspection or "walk-around," and appealing the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission's award.

45.
Id. § 651(b)(12).
46. See, e.g., Jon Jefferson, Dying for Work: A Weak OSHA and Declining Unions
Mean Danger on the Job, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 46 (describing media accounts of
workplace accidents).
47.
See Elaine Dodge & Terri Shuck, Q. Two Years After the North Carolina
PoultryFire, What's Changed?A. Not Much, LAB. NOTES, Feb. 1994, at 11.
48.
See id.
49.
See id. The main source of intimidation was fear of losing their jobs. See id.
One worker told reporters that employees were afraid to unionize because the
company threatened to fire anyone who signed a petition supporting a union. See id.
50.
See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 12, at 22 (presenting statistics demonstrating that from OSHA's enactment in 1970 until 1993, 200,000 workers were killed
on the job, 1.4 million were permanently disabled, and 2 million died from
occupation-related diseases).
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The statute provides three opportunities for an employee to
make complaints and request safety inspections. First, "[any
employees or representative of employees who believe that a
violation of a safety or health standard exists ...may request
an inspection by giving notice to the Secretary [of Labor]
....",The second and third opportunities occur before and
during the physical inspection, when an employee or representative can notify the Administration of violations she believes
exist in the workplace.5 2
The "walk-around" provision establishes that "a representative of the employer and a representative authorized by
his employees shall be given an opportunity to accompany the
Secretary of Labor or his authorized representative during the
physical inspection of [a] workplace.""3 After the inspection,
the Secretary of Labor determines whether to issue a citation
for a violation. 4 Once issued, "any employee or representative
of employees [has fifteen working days to file] a notice with
the Secretary alleging that the period of time fixed in the
citation for the abatement of the violation is unreasonable."5 5
Several provisions in the statute require agency action, and
employees are dependent on those agencies to fulfill their
statutory obligations.5 6 For example, the Secretary of Labor
promulgates occupational safety and health standards,5" has
authority to conduct investigations of workplace sites,5" and
issues citations for violations of the Act.5 9 Without inspection
and citation by the Secretary, employers go unpenalized for
violations of the Act. Because most agency inspections result
from employee complaints,60 without a complaint there

51.
OSHA, 29 US.C. § 657(f)(1) (1994 & Supp. I 1995). OSHA no longer requires
formal written complaints. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment
Rights: PreliminaryGuidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 501 n.281
(1992).
52.
See OSHA § 657(f)(2).
53.
See id. § 657(e). The Act does not define "representative authorized by his
employees."
54.
See id. § 658.

55.

Id. § 659(c).

56.
See Summers, supra note 51, at 504.
57.
See OSHA § 655.
58.
See id. § 657.
59.
See id. § 658.
60.
See MICHAEL YATES, POWER ON THE JOB: THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF WORKING
PEOPLE 246 (1994) (explaining that although the Administration targets certain
industries and conducts random investigations, employee complaints lead to the
majority of inspections).
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probably would not be an investigation. Lack of adequate
resources also results in an inadequate number of
inspections. 6
Judicial review of orders issued by the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission (the Commission) can involve
both private parties and the Secretary of Labor. For example,
the statute contemplates the need for further evidence in the
event that the reviewing court sends a case back to the Commission,6 2 and employees are the best source of such evidence
because they witness the day-to-day operations. In addition,
the Secretary "may ... obtain review or enforcement of any
final order of the Commission."6 3 Finally, the Secretary has
responsibility for investigating charges filed by employees
alleging retaliation by the employer for filing complaints with
the Administration.64
2. Collective Action Problems-Collective action problems
among workers limit the effectiveness of OSHA enforcement.
In the case of a plant in which unsafe conditions exist, the
logic of collective action says that the rational employee
probably will not file a complaint With the Secretary of Labor
because she expects someone else to do so. 6 5 As previously
noted, a safe workplace is a public good that benefits all
workers. Therefore, an individual has little incentive to
address a safety or health concern for the benefit of everyone
else. 66 The question is how much money and time the individual is willing to spend, and how much risk she is willing to
take to achieve this type of "qualitative" change in her
working environment. 7
Individuals seeking enforcement of OSHA may face daunting
time commitments. Enforcement requires time to contact the
agency, to walk around the plant with an inspector, to provide
the inspector with information, and to negotiate resolution of
the situation after the complaint is filed. 68 Later appeals may

61.
See Summers, supra note 51, at 510.
62.
See OSHA § 660(a)-(b).
63.
Id. § 660(b).
64.
See id. § 660(c).
65.
See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
66.
See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
67.
See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 72. Another author suggests that today's
workforce may in fact be quite motivated to obtain a higher quality of life at work,
including job satisfaction and job security. See Michael Ballott, New Directions in
Union Organizing, 45 LAB. L.J. 779, 781 (1994).
68.
See YATES, supra note 60, at 248-49 (discussing the enforcement process).
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require employee testimony.69 Additionally, if the inspection is
complex, the closing conference could be several weeks after
the physical inspection. v
Depending on the time commitment involved, a worker may
conclude that it is too difficult and costly to remain devoted to
the issue. In fact, the time involved may actually cause the
employee to forego wages she could have earned if she had
been working instead of participating in the investigation. A
few cases have addressed the issue of wages lost for participating in a walk-around. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that OSHA does
not require an employer to pay wages for time spent by employees accompanying Administration inspectors on the
walk-around."' In Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp.,72 four employees
who were union members argued that not entitling employees
to their wages during a walk-around would discourage employee participation and frustrate the purposes of OSHA. 3 In
response, the court asserted that employees can bargain for
such payments in the union's collective bargaining agreement
with the employer."4 While unionized employees may be able
to bargain for these wages, the court disregarded the fact that
this opportunity would not be available to nonunionized
employees. v5
The Leone case was distinguished by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Magma Copper Co.
v. Secretary of Labor.v" In Magma Copper the court held that
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 197777 requires
employers to pay each representative of the miners for time
spent accompanying health inspectors on their inspection. 8
Unlike OSHA, the Mine Safety statute specifically requires
payment.7 9 The court broadly interpreted the statute to say
that a representative of miners may accompany each inspector

69.
See OSHA § 660(a).
70.
See DON J. LOFGREN, DANGEROUS PREMISES: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF OSHA
ENFORCEMENT 3 (1989).
71.
See Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
72.
Id.
73.
See id. at 1161.
74.
See id.
75.
See id.; see also, e.g., FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supranote 23, at 8-9 (discussing
the benefits of collective bargaining by unions).
76.
645 F.2d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 1981).
77.
30 U.S.C. § 801 (1994).
78.
See Magma Copper, 645 F.2d at 695.
79.
See 30 U.S.C. § 813(f); Magma Copper, 645 F.2d at 699.
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and not suffer loss of wages.80 In explaining why this
interpretation was proper (as opposed to a more limited reading that would not have required payment to representatives
accompanying a second inspector) the court highlighted two
pieces of legislative history. 81 First, the court referred to one
senator's argument "that miner participation in inspections is
essential to increased miner awareness of safety problems and
that such participation could not be expected unless the
miners were paid for their time."82 Second, the court specifically found that the purpose of the walk-around pay provision
is "to assure that
miners will exercise their right to participate
83
inspections."
in
The analysis used in Magma Copper applies by analogy to
OSHA. Despite the statute's silence on the payment of wages,
legislative history shows that Congress recognized the importance of employee participation. 84 One Senate report noted
that an authorized employee representative could aid the
inspection process and introduce "an appropriate degree of
involvement of employees themselves.""
In addition to participation time, employees also need time
to gather information before the inspection. In order to adequately enforce their rights under OSHA, employees need both
on-the-job, risk-awareness education and greater knowledge of
their legal rights. Most employees do not know what rights
OSHA affords them or how to file a complaint.8 6 Without this
information, employees may not appreciate the importance of
taking action. "[A] sense of powerlessness to control hazards
can lead to an indifference regarding health and safety."8 "
In addition to the hurdles mentioned above, the risk of
employer retaliation is a disincentive for an employee to
independently seek a collective benefit. The chance of losing
one's job increases the costs an individual faces in seeking a
safe and healthy working environment. Despite the statute's

80.
See Magma Copper, 645 F.2d at 697.
81.
See id. at 697-98.
82.
Id. at 697 (summarizing Senator Javits' argument).
83.
Id. at 698.
84.
See S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 10 (1970).
85.
Id. at 11.
86.
See YATES, supra note 60, at 245; Jefferson, supra note 46, at 51 (quoting
Deborah Berkowitz, health and safety director for the United Food and Commercial
Workers International).
87.
LOFGREN, supra note 70, at 204.
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guarantee of confidentiality,8 8 the reality is that employees
filing OSHA complaints are often fired illegally. 89 The risk of
being detected as the complainant is higher in smaller work
environments and nonunion shops9 ° because an employee does
not have the anonymity that flows from large numbers and the
protective barrier created by a union. Technically, employees
are protected from losing their jobs by the Act's
anti-retaliation provision.9 ' In reality, however, an employee
has only thirty days in which to file a complaint alleging that
she has been discriminated against for instituting proceedings
under the Act. 92 Such a short statute of limitations may cut off
legitimate claims if the employee is not well-informed of her
rights and the procedure for instituting administrative action.

B. WARNA
93
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(WARNA), passed in 1988, 94 represents a recent attempt by
Congress to provide some minimum standards to protect
workers faced with mass layoffs and plant closings. As suggested by its name, the statute requires notice of a layoff or
plant closing,9 5 thereby enabling employees to obtain training
to qualify them for new jobs.
This Part argues that the statute's effectiveness will be
limited if employers do not fear the consequences of failing to
provide adequate, timely notice. The absence of agency involvement and the limitation of the term "representative" to
labor unions emerge as the two major weaknesses in the
statute.

88.
See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1994 & Supp. I 1995) (allowing the person
notifying the Secretary of a violation to request that her name and names of individual employees not appear in the copy of the written notice sent to the employer).
89. See YATES, supra note 60, at 237; see also Summers, supra note 51, at 512
(explaining that employee self-help is limited because there is little assurance of
retaliation protection).
90.
See LOFGREN, supra note 70, at 204-05.
91.
See OSHA § 660(c).
92. See OSHA § 660(c)(1)-(2).
93. WARNA, 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
94. Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109
(1988)).
95. See WARNA § 2102.
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1. The Statutory Scheme-WARNA provides the following:
An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff
until the end of a 60-day period after the employer serves
written notice of such an order-(1) to each representative
of the affected employees as of the time of the notice or, if
there is no such representative at that time, to each
affected employee .... "
WARNA, unlike OSHA, specifically defines "the term
'representative."'9 7 Essentially, the statute requires employers
to send notification of plant closing or layoffs to the union
representing the affected employees.98 Where no majority
union exists, notice must be sent to each employee. 99
The liability provision of the statute provides three enforcement options. These options are single employee suits (one
employee suing for herself), class action suits (employee suing
for herself and other similarly situated employees), or suits
filed by a union on behalf of one employee or a group of employees (suit brought by a "representative of the employees"). 0 0 The only role envisioned for the Secretary of Labor is
to prescribe regulations to carry out the statute. 10
It is important to note that WARNA only protects employees
working for companies with one hundred or more employees, 0 2
and that the notice requirement is triggered only when a
threshold number of employees are laid off.' °3 In cases of plant
closings or mass layoffs, a large group of employees undergoes
a shared experience. Consequently, the overall rights protected
under the statute are in fact "fundamentally collective in
nature." 10 4

96.

WARNA § 2102(a)(1).

97.
Id. § 2101(a)(4) (defining a "representative" as 'an exclusive representative
of employees within the meaning of section 159(a) ... of this title").
98.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a), 2101(a)(4), 2102(a). Unions are entitled to exclusive
representation of employees in a bargaining unit. See id. § 159(a).
99.
See WARNA § 2102(a)(1).
100. Id. § 2104(a)(5).
101. See id. § 2107(a).
102. See id. § 2101(a)(1).
103. See id. § 2101(a)(1)-(3).
104. Amicus Brief of the American Federation of Government Employees for
Petitioner at 11, United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown
Group, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1529 (1996) (No. 95-340), available in Westlaw, 1995 WL
716541 [hereinafter Amicus Brie/] (making this argument on behalf of the union).
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2. Collective Action Problems-One commentator laments
the lack of enforcement under WARNA and the very few cases
that have been brought under WARNA. 0 5 He emphasizes
several reasons why employees experience difficulty bringing
cases effectively under WARNA. First, "starting a WARNA
case can involve determining the proper parties to sue, the
exact numbers of employees at a site, and other complex
issues."'0 6 Obtaining this type of information requires a dedication of time on the part of individual workers, time that an
individual may be unwilling to sacrifice given that the benefit
to herself may be relatively insubstantial." 7 She may suspect
that others have undergone the same injury, and that they
will gather the necessary information.
The information needed to institute an effective lawsuit
represents a public good. Once one laid off employee makes
the effort to compile the information, all other employees may
benefit from this knowledge without investing any time to
gather it; For example, if one employee uses the information
in a successful court case, other employees may do the same.
Thus, the information has both necessary qualities of public
goods, namely jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion.lO8
In addition, workers often lack adequate knowledge of their
rights under WARNA and adequate resources to pursue litigation.'0 9 In order to obtain this public good, an employee
must invest the time and money required to gather the necessary information. The absence of administrative enforcement
exacerbates the classic collective action problems associated
with litigation, and the statute recognizes this i~n part by
authorizing unions to sue as representatives for employees.
Unions, therefore, fill the role otherwise occupied by an
agency.

105. See Richard W. McHugh, Fair Warning Or Foul? An Analysis of the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act in Practice, 14 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 59-60 (1993).
106. Id. at 54.
107. See WARNA § 2104(a) (describing available benefits in the form of damages
for aggrieved employees).
108. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
109. See McHugh, supra note 105, at 61 (concluding that "lack of knowledge about
WARNA and a lack of resources to pursue litigation is a reason for the low number
of WARNA cases").
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C. FLSA

The collective action issues associated with OSHA and
WARNA enforcement are also present in FLSA enforcement.
This Part demonstrates that a central weakness of the statute
is the limited ability of employee representatives or labor
unions to act on behalf of employees.
1. The Statutory Scheme-The central enforcement provision of FLSA involves enforcement through the United States
Department of Labor (Department)." 0 In particular, the
statute provides for complete investigation by the Department's Wage and Hour Division, and the filing of actions by
the Secretary of Labor."' In addition, section 216 of the
statute creates a private cause of action to recover unpaid
minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, and/or reinstatement which "may be maintained
against any employer ... by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated."" 2 The statute prescribes three enforcement
options: suits by the Secretary of Labor, single employee suits,
and opt-in class action suits.
The original version of section 216 looked more like
WARNA, stating that actions could be maintained "by any one
or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves
and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or
employees may designate an agent or representative to
maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees
similarly situated." 3 The highlighted language anticipates
representational lawsuits in which a representative, such as
a union, could file on behalf of a single employee or a group of
employees. One reviewer of the original statute concluded that
"1]abor unions play an important part in policing the Act and

110. See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 211 (1994 & Supp. I 1995) (dealing with investigations
and inspections). See generally Summers, supra note 51, at 491 (noting that
"[primary responsibility for enforcement is, in principle, through the Department of
Labor").
111. See FLSA § 211(a); see also YATES, supra note 60, at 242-43 (discussing how
FLSA functions).
112. FLSA § 216(b).
113. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994 & Supp. I 1995)) (emphasis added).
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are destined to play an even greater part."" 4 The role of
unions was altered by congressional changes to the representation provision made when section 216 was revised by the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947.15 Most reviewers of the legislative history of this statute conclude that the change was
intended to lessen the number of frivolous lawsuits." 6 Others
emphasize legislative history that implies a strong anti-union

sentiment. 117
2. Collective Action Problems-As a result of the enforcement mechanisms in FLSA, it suffers from similar problems
faced under OSHA and WARNA." s Just as individuals are
unlikely to have the incentive to file OSHA complaints, the
lack of direct suits by individual workers against employers
for FLSA violations may be the result of a similar incentive
structure." 9 Two limitations on employee incentives to file suit
under FLSA are the limited benefits of pursuing one's own
claim (individual claims are often small) 2 ° and the high risks
the employee faces due to employer retaliation.' 2 ' Additional
limitations include ignorance of the law and the difficulty of
gathering information.' 2 2 Individual employees also have
23
limited resources, as recognized in the legislative history.

114. Samuel Herman, The Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor
StandardsAct, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 368, 377 (1939) (footnote omitted).
115. Ch. 52, § 5, 61 Stat. 84, 87 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994 & Supp. I
1995)). This section of the Portal-to-Portal Act was entitled "Representative Actions
Banned." Id. The amendment was directed primarily at lawsuits filed by union
officials, attorneys, and other agents and representatives of employees suing for back
pay. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT OF 1947 47 (1947)
(presenting an overview of the legislative history of the act).
116. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 115, at 1-2. Congress aimed
to address the concern over the flood of lawsuits following a Supreme Court case
which broadened the scope of overtime compensation. The effect of the change was
to outlaw representative actions only, not collective action such as class actions, and
to prevent suits by "an outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous of stirring up
litigation without being an employee at all." Id. at F-8 (statement of Sen. Donnell in
a reprint of the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on H.R. 2157).
117. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the
Portal-to-PortalAct of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 167 (1991). Linder believes that
Congress' purpose was aimed much more at stopping unions from filing suits on
behalf of large numbers of employees than at so-called "excessive litigation." Id. at
172 n.685.
118. See discussion supra Parts II.A.2, B.2.
119. See Summers, supra note 51, at 496.
120. See id. at 497 ("The average minimum pay claim is less than $200 and the
average overtime claim is less than $400.").
121. See id. at 496.
122. See id.
123. See 93 CONG. REC. 2098 (1947).
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Senator Aiken hypothesized about the difficulties faced by "the
man who does not belong to a union at all, and is not financially able to go to the expense" of proving the existence of124a
contractual promise or customary practice in the industry.
Marc Linder argues that both changes made to section 216
in the Portal-to-Portal Act-the ban on representational suits
and the opt-in procedure-have interfered with FLSA enforcement. 125 First, he notes that virtually all Portal suits are
brought by unionized employees as representative actions
naming a union official as the representative. 26 Second, even
in cases where nonunion employees bring suits, the statute
deprives them of the opt-out class action, such that they "are
remitted to a very ineffectual means of pressuring employers
to comply with the FLSA." 127 "[Tlhe restrictive individualistic

framework imposed by the consent requirement" 128 adds additional legal barriers to already difficult attempts at collective
action.
Finally, employees face fear of retaliation by their employer
for exercising their rights under FLSA. One court recognized
this concern in holding that class suits are available under
section 216.129 The Third Circuit in Pentland v. Dravo Corp.,
acknowledged that "employees, if they wish, can join in their
litigation so that no one of them need stand alone in doing
something likely to incur the displeasure of an employer. It
brings something of the strength of collective bargaining to a
collective lawsuit."130
III. ALTERNATiVE ENFORCERS

Because of the range of collective action problems discussed
above in Part II, many of the procedures and remedies for
enforcing worker rights are ineffective or unsatisfactory. Clyde
Summers formulates three general conclusions regarding the
shortcomings of available remedies and enforcement

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
See Linder, supra note 117, at 167-76.
See id. at 172.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 175.
See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945).
Id.
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mechanisms.'3 1 First, he argues that employees cannot rely on
government agencies to enforce their rights. 132 Second, litigation is too cumbersome and expensive. 1 33 Third, individuals
lack the information, resources, and psychological support to
enforce their rights. 1 34 He suggests that by grouping their
resources and selecting a representative, employees can over3
come the limitations they face through collective action.1 1
The enforcement methods described in this Part address
some collective action problems better than others. Although
class actions and agencies play important roles, employee
participation groups and labor unions emerge as the most
important enforcement mechanisms because a representative
can aid employees in enforcing their rights.

A. Class Action Lawsuits

Where a statute creates a private cause of action, class
action lawsuits can be used as a form of collective action.
"Class actions permit individual litigants and their attorneys
to construct a formal collectivity, the class, without actually
mobilizing a group .... ,136 Once the class is formed and the
legal issue narrowed, the claim can "serve as a focal point for
the mobilization of a group,"'3 7 and a group identity can develop around the class representatives.'3 8 Furthermore, the
practical benefits of class
actions increase the chances of
1 39
enforcement.
statutory

131.
132.
133.
134.
worker

See Summers, supra note 51, at 545-46.
See id.
See id.
See id. Similarly, Charles Craver argues that the greatest impediment to
organization is workers' ignorance of their legal rights and their fear of

employer reprisals. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 80 (1993).

135.

See Summers, supra note 51, at 545-46.

136.

BRYANT G. GARTH, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, POWER AND LEGAL ARTIFICE:

THE FEDERAL CLASS ACTION 1 (ABF Working Paper #9121, (1)).
137. Id. at 32. Despite the potential for mobilization, Garth is skeptical of the
broad, political effects of class actions. See id. He concludes that class action attorneys do not seek to use the procedure as a tool to build an activist class. See id.
138. See id. at 40.
139. For example, class actions aggregate many claims that are otherwise too
small to be worth an attorney's time to litigate individually. See Stephen C. Yeazell,
From Group Litigation to Class Action, PartII: Interest, Class, and Representation,
27 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1089 n.114 (1980); see also GARTH, supra note 136, at 43-44,
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Despite the benefits, this method faces some of the same
limitations that individual plaintiffs face because the focus of
the class action remains on particular employees' efforts. First,
the case needs at least one activist individual to take initiative
for the good of the group. 40 An individual may lack incentive
to take the lead because named plaintiffs face greater risks.
These risks include ostracism and hostility from the individual's current employer and a "scarred reputation as a
trouble-maker within the industry where [the individual]
works ...

,," It is also difficult for plaintiffs to get the neces-

sary evidence to prove their claims because employers may not
keep sufficient records. 42 And finally, once a class is formed,
collective action problems make it unlikely that class members
will have the incentive to monitor the lawyer's behavior
because each member's stake in the outcome is quite small.'43
The costs and benefits associated with class actions differ
depending on the type of rights involved. This section examines the availability and effectiveness of class action litigation
under OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA. Class actions are available
under WARNA and FLSA, but they prove effective only where
a representative can sue on behalf of employees. Thus, because
WARNA provides for such representation, it should serve as
a model for statutory amendments to OSHA and FLSA. In
addition, OSHA should be amended to include litigation as an
enforcement method, and the opt-in requirement of FLSA
should be removed to bring the act in line with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.'
OSHA foresees only a limited role for litigation and does not
provide for class action suits. Employees are dependent on the
Health Administration to conduct frequent, effective
inspections and to impose penalties to deter future violations.

47 (arguing that a certified class justifies the initial expense of litigation and
increases attorney efforts).
140. See GARTH, supra note 136, at 21 (concluding that starting a class action
"takes remarkable initiative and some anger").
141. Sofia C. Hubscher, Making It Worth Plaintiffs'While: Extra Incentive Awards
to Named Plaintiffsin Class Action Employment DiscriminationLawsuits, 23 COLUM.
HuM. RTs. L. REV. 463, 470 (1991-92); see also GARTH, supra note 136, at 24 (finding
certain situations in which the attorney may have difficulty getting additional
plaintiffs involved).
142. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 51, at 492-93 (referring to employer

record-keeping violations, where the investigator is forced to track down employees
in order to collect payroll information).
143. See GARTH, supra note 136, at 9.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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OSHA should be amended, using WARNA as a model, to
provide an opportunity for a class action on behalf of similarly
situated employees injured due to statutory violations.
Litigation is the only enforcement scheme created under
WARNA. The statutory language allows private suits on
behalf of "other persons similarly situated," 145 and courts have
held that this language, as well as the nature of the statute,
provide for class action suits under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.146 In Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., Inc., 4 7
the court noted that WARNA "seems particularly amenable to
class litigation. By its terms, WARNA is applicable only in the
context of employer action which affects a large number of
employees." 4 s More specifically, in concluding that the plaintiffs met the initial requirements of Rule 23(a), 149 the court in
Cruz v. Robert Abbey, Inc. 5 ' found that "plaintiffs' limited
economic resources makes [sic] it unlikely that separate
actions would be brought if the plaintiffs' motion [for class
certification] were [sic] denied." 5 ' The two cases both recognize the reality of collective action difficulties, and that the
availability of the class action procedure alleviates those
difficulties to some degree.
WARNA goes one step further by allowing representational
lawsuits. Under WARNA, a union representative may sue on
behalf of a class of employees." 2 Although this alternative may
avoid some of the initial problems in forming a class action,
the union representative may have very little stake in the
lawsuit. A union is not crucial to start a WARNA suit. Because
WARNA suits most likely involve employees who have been
laid off, concerns regarding plaintiffs' fear of a continuing

145. WARNA, 29 US.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
146. See, e.g., Cruz v. Robert Abbey, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 605, 612 (E.D.N.Y 1991)
(finding that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 for class certification); Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 460, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(same).
147. 726 F. Supp. at 465.
148. Id.
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a) lists four prerequisites to a class action:
numerosity, common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims or defenses of class
members, and class representatives who fairly and adequately protect class interests.
See id. Section (b) provides three types of classes with additional prerequisites to
those in section (a). See id. 23(b).
150. 778 F. Supp. at 612.
151. Id. at 612.
152. See WARNA, 29 US.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
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hostile working relationship are absent. For these reasons,
litigation may not be one of the better methods for enforcing
WARNA.
In contrast to OSHA and WARNA, litigation is one of the
basic enforcement mechanisms under FLSA. Specifically, the
statute creates a private cause of action in addition to lawsuits
brought by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of aggrieved
employees. 5 3 The Secretary's role is discussed later.'5 4
Despite the individualized nature of the remedy in FLSA
actions, violations of the Act usually apply to a group or
category of individuals.' 5 5 While FLSA anticipates group
litigation, 5 6 the procedure differs from that under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Under FLSA, potential plaintiffs
must opt-in, that is, give written consent to join the class.'5 7 In
contrast, the federal rules utilize an opt-out procedure. 158
As a result of the opt-in requirement, FLSA class actions are
less effective than they could be in enforcing the statute. First,
the requirement mandates availability of information regarding legal rights and procedures because potential plaintiffs
must affirmatively act to be included.' 59 Also, it is unclear how
much latitude named plaintiffs have to notify potential coplaintiffs. The statute itself gives no guidance to courts about
whether the original plaintiff is allowed to provide notice, 60

153. See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(a), 216(b) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
154. See infra Part III.B.3.
155. See Summers, supra note 51, at 497.
156. See FLSA § 211(b).
157. See id. One author proposes a possible solution to this procedural dilemma.
See Janet M. Bowermaster, Two (Federal) Wrongs Make A (State) Right: State
Class-Action ProceduresAs An Alternative to the Opt-In ClassAction Provisionof the
ADEA, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 7, 51 (1991) (noting that federal causes of action
can sometimes be brought in state court, where more protective state procedural
rules may apply). FLSA litigants may file in state court to take advantage of greater
protection that may be available under state rules of procedure. However, in state
court an employee will have to show that the employer owes her more than the

minimum amount required under state law, which may be higher than the federal
minimum wage. See YATES, supra note 60, at 243.
158. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)-(3) (allowing class actions under (b)(1) or (b)(2)
to proceed without notice of an option to request inclusion in the class, but requiring
such notice for actions under (b)(3)). For an interesting discussion of the philosophies
underlying the structure of Rule 23, see Yeazell, supra note 139.
159. See Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d 1263, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 1984)
(recognizing that "the § 216(b) action tends to discourage collective litigation by
virtue of the requirement of an affirmative act by each plaintiff," but nevertheless
refusing to issue notice to putative plaintiffs).
160. See Barbara McAdoo, The Class Action Notice Under the FLSA: Denial Is A
Threat to Effective Remedies in ADEA Actions, 91 DICK. L. REv. 357, 357-58 (1986)
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but the Supreme Court has held that district courts have
discretion in appropriate cases to facilitate notice to potential
plaintiffs.' 6 ' While this holding is somewhat helpful, the opt-in
requirement continues to discourage claims by nonunion
employees. The requirement "has injured unorganized workers, who, deprived of the opt-out class action, are remitted to
a very ineffectual means of pressuring employers to comply
with FLSA. " 162 The opt-in requirement creates a particularly
acute problem in minimum wage cases because employees are
63
difficult to locate due to frequent job changes.

B. FederalAgency Enforcement

In light of the limitations of class actions, potential intervention by the Department of Labor is an important alternative method for overcoming collective action problems. Both
OSHA and FLSA create a variety of roles for the Department.
This Part analyzes how effectively those statutory roles
address the problems associated with collective action. As for
WARNA, the statute does not empower the Department to act
on behalf of employees. Granting the Department power to
enforce WARNA is a potential area of reform. This reform
could be achieved by combining the roles played by the agencies under OSHA and FLSA and using those statutes as a
model.
1. Agency Action Under OSHA-Under OSHA, the Secretary of Labor is responsible for inspecting facilities, 61 issuing
citations,' 65 and handling employee allegations of retaliation

(discussing a circuit split on the issue of whether plaintiffs can send notice to
potential plaintiffs of a pending action under section 216(b) of FLSA, and concluding
that a negative answer could effectively eliminate the class action tool for FLSA and
ADEA cases). Note that this article was published before the Supreme Court decided
the issue.
161. See Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989). This case
is relevant to FLSA because section 216(b) is incorporated into the ADEA by section
626(b). See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
162. Linder, supra note 117, at 167. Linder is extremely critical of cases and law
review articles that play down the restrictive nature of FLSA procedures. See id. at
167-75. He concludes that "the restrictive individualistic framework imposed by the
consent requirement" limits the remedial value of the statute. Id. at 175.
163. See Summers, supra note 51, at 497-98.
164. See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
165. See id. § 658(a).
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by employers."6 6 The agency may be most effective at the
initial complaint stage, because it only takes knowledge of a
phone number or an address and a small investment of time
to file a complaint. If a worker is likely to take any action at
all, she might at least make a phone call or write a letter to
the agency. This is based in part on the cost-benefit analysis
the employee performs.
Under OSHA, the collective good of a safety inspection is
provided by an external source, the Department of Labor.
Consequently, it takes merely a one-time commitment to get
the agency to act for the benefit of all. 167 This remedy is
limited depending on the seriousness of the alleged safety
hazard. If the complaint does not require immediate attention,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (the
Administration) sends a letter to the employer and a copy to
the employee. 6 8 If the employer fails to take corrective action,
the employee must notify the agency again.19 This procedure
may increase the costs and risks to the employee; and if her
stake in the outcome is not high enough, she will probably
wait for someone else to act.
Overall, the availability of an administrative scheme and an
active agency establishes a permanent representative who can
advance the collective interests of employees. Because OSHA
has the ability to obtain workplace improvements before
accidents happen, an administrative component is particularly
important for health and safety enforcement. 170 However, the
Administration's power is limited. A former Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health admitted
that "OSHA cannot do the task alone."' 7 ' He emphasized that
enforcement can only go so far, and "[tlhe key is to convince
those affected by OSHA that safety and health in the
workplace is beneficial to all." 7 2
Although agency enforcement is not optimal, and the Administration faces severe limits, 173 other alternatives should

166. See id. § 660(c)(2).
167. See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 52.
168. See Whiting, supra note 39, at 265.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 260.
171. John H. Stender, An OSHA Perspective and Prospective, 26 LAB. L.J. 71, 71
(1975).
172. Id.
173. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's lack ofresources limits
the number of inspections it can perform. See Summers, supra note 51, at 509-10. In

806

University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform

[VOL. 30:4

not completely eclipse the agency's role. It is insufficient to
argue merely that the Administration's role as enforcer of
workplace health and safety should be abolished. "We cannot
imagine a comprehensive program to secure workplace health
and safety other than through
the resources of a government
17 4
agency such as OSHA."
Kneisner and Leeth discuss several problems with OSHA in
particular and with regulation in general. They also suggest
reforms to solve these problems. First, they assert that "there
is no indication that OSHA's actions have led to any significant reductions in injuries on the job."'75 In place of the
current scheme, they propose alternative ideas that do not
address the collective action problems associated with those
alternatives. 176 Because they believe that OSHA gets too
involved in minor hazards, they mention a Republican proposal that would require workers to report their concerns
about health and safety to their employers before going to the
Administration.17 Classic problems associated with lack of
incentive due to risk of retaliation
call into question the
17
plausibility of this method.
In response to the lack of adequate penalties imposed by the
Administration, Kneisner and Leath propose a second
change-" allowing workers to sue their employers for clear-cut
cases of negligence." 7 9 The problem with this solution is that
all of the limitations typically associated with litigation also
surface here, including high costs, low incentives, and proof
problems because of limited access to employer records (if in
fact such records exist at all). And even if this option has some
advantages, it could simply be added to the statute rather
than replacing the agency's role altogether.

general, regulatory enforcement is inadequate because there are too many work sites,
and the activity at those sites varies too much. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 12,
at 22.
174. Rabin, supra note 8, at 195.
175. Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, Abolishing OSHA, 4 REGULATION 46,
47 (1995).
176. One particular alternative, that "OSHA would set performance goals and
allow firms to determine how best to achieve the desired outcomes," id. at 51, ignores
collective action problems among companies themselves. The so-called Prisoner's
Dilemma model is often used to depict why an individual (here a company) will
choose not to make the decision that is best for all, and instead focus on self-interest.
See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 25-30.
177. See Kniesner & Leeth, supra note 175, at 52.
178. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
179. Kniesner & Leeth, supra note 175, at 54.
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In support of their proposals, Kniesner and Leeth claim that
workers have fairly accurate information on the frequency of
workplace accidents.18 ° They neglect to mention, however,
workers' lack of knowledge about their legal rights. Their
acknowledgment that "information must be presented in a way
that permits informed judgments"' 8 ' actually supports an
increased role for the Administration, because it can require
employers to supply this information and enforce regulations
designed to keep workers informed. For example, the Administration supplies information through agency-sponsored
18 2
training, education, and consultation programs.
Another crucial role for the Administration is handling
statutory discrimination claims. But enforcement of the antidiscrimination provision is inadequate. When an employee
files a complaint alleging employer retaliation for involvement
in an OSHA investigation, the process of dealing with the
complaint is painfully slow.'8 3 Several thousand employees file
complaints alleging retaliation with the Administration each
year, and the Department of Labor pursues less than one
percent of them.'8 4 Because the Department has no time
constraints for evaluating these complaints, claims "languish
for years in a bureaucratic black hole." 185 From 1980 to 1992,
the Department determined that more than five thousand
cases had evidence of whistleblower discrimination, yet only
eight cases were litigated on behalf of whistleblowers. 8 6 The
logical conclusion is that either some additional enforcement
method must be made available to employees or Labor Department resources must be increased.
2. Agency Action Under WARNA-WARNA does not
provide for the involvement of an agency in enforcing the statute. One commentator proposes an amendment to WARNA
providing for filing claims with the Department of Labor and
investigation by the Department. 8 7 Also, a government agency
could provide activities to better advise unions and workers of
their rights.'
Consequently, statutory reform to WARNA

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
See Whiting, supra note 39, at 270.
See YATES, supra note 60, at 237.
See Jefferson, supra note 46, at 49.
Dodge & Shuck, supra note 47, at 11.
See id.
See McHugh, supra note 105, at 67.
See id. at 70.
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should involve inclusion of a provision empowering an agency
to field complaints and assist in collecting information. In
addition, the agency should have the ability to bring suits on
behalf of employees.
3. Agency Action Under FLSA-The Secretary of Labor's
role under FLSA focuses more on litigating suits on behalf of
workers than on preventing problems. Because direct suits by
employees against their employers are few in number, 8 9 the
Department's role is key.' 9° Even shortly after the Act's passage in 1939, however, lack of funding caused enforcement
problems.' 9 ' "The range of its regulatory activity, together with
the limited resources of the Wage and Hour Division [of the
Department of Labor], . .. make adequate administration
impractical, if not virtually impossible, without the aid of
outside sources. " "' Recent congressional fact-finding revealed
that Wage and Hour Division field offices are "overwhelmed,
severely understaffed, and lacking essential equipment and
necessary supplies."'9 3 Certain statutory weaknesses also
make the Division's job more difficult.' 94 For collective action
purposes, agency action under FLSA, like under OSHA, needs
a supplemental method for enforcement.
Another limitation on suits by the Wage and Hour Division
involves the remedies available. Unlike Department-initiated
suits, private litigants can and often do recover liquidated
damages.'9 5 But once the Secretary files an action against an
employer, individual employees are foreclosed from bringing
private suits. 96 This increases the need for employees to
understand their rights and act quickly. When the agency
chooses not to pursue a case, employees are left to their own

189. See Summers, supra note 51, at 496.
190. The Wage & Hour Division of the Department of Labor accounts for nearly
three-quarters of enforcement activity under FLSA. See Problems in the Labor
Department'sEnforcement of Wage and Hour Laws: HearingsBefore the Employment
and Hous. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 102d Cong. 213 (1992)
[hereinafter Enforcement Hearings].
191. See Herman, supra note 114, at 370.
192. Id. at 376.
193. Enforcement Hearings, supra note 190, at 2.
194. For a discussion of the statutory weaknesses, see Enforcement Hearings,
supra note 190, at 162 (identifying lack of incentive to maintain payroll records,
requirement for litigation to enforce the statute and limitations on collection of back
wages as weaknesses of the statute).
195. See Summers, supra note 51, at 498. In an injunction suit, however, the
employee cannot collect liquidated damages. See YATES, supra note 60, at 243.
196. See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
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devices. Such individuals are often working at minimum wage
jobs and have neither the means nor the information
necessary to pursue a legal settlement. 9 7 The Department
should litigate those cases that involve many employees to
whom small amounts of money are owed because it is precisely
these situations which pose the most serious collective action
problems. ' 98

C. Employee ParticipationGroups

Employee participation in the workplace has emerged as a
means for improving the work place and protecting employee
rights. Since the 1980s, companies have instituted a variety of
efforts to involve workers in more aspects of the business.'9 9
This Part focuses on how well these participation groups can
mitigate the collective action problems associated with enforcing OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA.
"An alternative to ... inefficient noncooperative solution[s]
is a cooperative strategy in which all firm members choose to
work at the socially optimal level."2" 0 This type of cooperation
and workplace organization is crucial for enforcement of the
statutes discussed here because external legal controls2 ' are
unlikely to be sufficient.20 2 "[A] well-designed system of worker
representation ... can usefully supplement state efforts to
regulate labor market outcomes."20 3 As beneficial as employee
participation can be for a company, however, employees must
have incentives to participate. This includes perceiving the
programs as legitimate and as a source of empowerment.
A major debate in this area is whether these participation
groups can replace unions, or whether they are effective only

197. See Enforcement Hearings,supra note 190, at 170-71.
198. See id. at 170 n.l (noting that in such cases it will be harder for employees
to obtain the assistance of private attorneys).
199. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMM'N ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT 29 (1994)
[hereinafter FACT FINDING REPORT].

200.

David I. Levine & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation,Productivity,and

the Firm'sEnvironment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183,

186 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).
201. See supra Part III.B (discussing the role of agencies).
202. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 159 (1990).

203.

Freeman & Rogers, supra note 12, at 16.
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when working with unions. Some argue that in order to serve
as an independent source of employee power leading to longterm changes, a union must exist as a backdrop to the
participation groups. °4 On the other hand, firmly established,
employee-controlled groups may serve as an attractive
alternative to unions. While a survey done by the AFL-CIO
showed that nonunion workers recognize that concerted
activity is more useful and effective than acting alone, 0 5 the
survey also found that "non-union workers do not perceive unions as pursuing an institutional agenda drawn from the needs
and desires of their members."0 6 Unions themselves have
offered some support for "limited purpose, statutory
committees to assist in public regulation."2 7 Where a union
already exists, the union would coordinate the committees;
where there is no union, employees would hold secret ballot
elections to determine their representatives.0 8
Difficulty in initial organization of these groups stems from
classic collective action problems. 20 9 Being an activist employee
is both time consuming and risky, and the rational employee
will probably not participate if the benefits do not outweigh
the costs, or if she can free-ride on the benefits achieved by
the efforts of others. 1°

204. Paul Weiler concludes that nonunion employee involvement may provide
participation, but there is no serious protection from management. See WEILER, supra
note 202, at 34.
205. See AFL-CIO COMM. ON THE EVOLUTION OF WORK, supra note 28, at 11.
206. Id. at 9. Nonunion employees also believe that unions care solely about union
members and not the workforce as a whole. See CRAVER, supra note 134, at 65.
Craver argues that unions need to branch out and seek gains beyond the narrow
interests of a particular bargaining unit. See id. By providing benefits for a more
diverse range of employees, unions will demonstrate the influence that collective
action can have, both politically and in bargaining with the employer. See id. at
65-66. In order to finance these efforts, unions could impose service fees on nonmembers. See id. at 70. Still, the union should provide additional benefits available
only to members. See id. at 70-71. This type of associational membership was also
recommended by the AFL-CIO in 1985. See AFL-CIO COMM. ON THE EVOLUTION OF
WORK, supra note 28, at 15-16.
207. See AFL-CIO COMM. ON THE EVOLUTION OF WORK, supra note 28, at 38.
208. See id. A government commission similarly has recommended the expansion
of participation groups with the employees choosing whether or not to have formal
representation. See U.S. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS [Jan. 9, 1995] (BNA Special Supp.) S-12-17
(Jan. 10, 1995) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
209. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
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In one case study, the workers surveyed expressed a strong
interest in issues relating to the quality of working life.2 1 ' In
particular, the study found that workers already involved in
participation programs had a stronger interest in quality of
working life issues than nonparticipating employees.2 12 The
researchers proposed two reasons for this result. 2 3 First, those
workers who initially volunteer for quality of working life
team activities may start out with a higher overall interest in
participation. Second, participation may increase an employee's interest in having a say about her working environment.2 14
The first reason is consistent with the need for motivated
individuals to initiate class actions." 5 The second reason is
consistent with the idea that worker commitment to the job
improves through cooperation. 6 Once an employee recognizes
the benefits of cooperation and commitment, the free-rider
problem is mitigated by continual teamwork toward mutual
interests.
From a legal standpoint, employee work groups can provide
additional protection for employees when they confront
management. Pursuant to section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act,2" 7 employees have the right to form and join
organizations and engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of protecting the rights of the group.2 1 8 The protection
offered by "concerted" activity provides additional legal
protection against employer retaliation, thereby lessening the
risks an individual faces.

211. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., WORKER PARTICIPATION AND AMERICAN
UNIONS: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 106, 108-09 (1984).

212. See id. at 110.
213. See id.
214. See id. The study also found that an average of 35 percent of nonparticipating workers were interested in getting involved. See id. at 123. However, the range
across the four cases studied went from 15 percent interest to 63 percent. See id. at
123-24. The authors concluded that the interest level depended on how the specific
programs were perceived by the workers. See id. at 124.
215. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
216. See Peter J. Robertson, & Shui-Yan Tang, The Role of Commitment in
Collective Action: Comparing the Organizational Behavior and Rational Choice
Perspectives, PUB. ADMIN. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 67, 69. Robertson and Tang
present a useful discussion of two models for explaining how commitment affects
collective action. See id. at 69-70. The first is Olson's brand of rational choice, which
finds cooperation inherently problematic. See id. The second is organizational
behaviorism, which takes for granted individual willingness to act in accordance with
group interests. See id. Both theories are useful for explaining how and why
workplace participation groups develop.
217. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
218. See id § 157.
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1. Employee Participation Under OSHA-Safety and
health committees are widely used to monitor and improve the
workplace.2 1 9 Such committees, when properly structured and
planned, "can significantly improve safety and health protection" for workers. 220 Employee participation is particularly
useful to an OSHA enforcer because of the nature of the rights
being protected. Unlike the interests protected by WARNA and
FLSA, employee safety and health require ongoing, day-to-day
enforcement, which an OSHA agent cannot accomplish on his
own. Also, where union contracts traditionally focus on negative aspects of the job, such as protection from injury,"'
participation groups seek employee contribution to positive
aspects of the job.
Existing participation groups can be especially effective by
cooperating with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. One proposal for employee participation recommends
that the Administration develop guidelines allowing workplace
programs to be internally responsible for applying the vast
number of regulations that exist.22 2 The existence of an agency
that can step into the picture when needed, in combination
with an on-site organization that actively seeks a safe
workplace, seems like the best method f6r overcoming collective action problems. Furthermore, the presence of a representative may increase employee involvement in an OSHA
walk-around.
Despite these advantages, there is at least one situation
where unions prove to be better enforcers than safety committees. When an employee files a workplace safety grievance,
the process of resolving that grievance internally may take
longer than if a local union files an OSHA complaint. 22 3 By
filing the complaint, the union puts pressure on management
to deal with the grievance more quickly. However, there is no

219. See FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 199, at 40.
220. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 208, at S-14.
221. See Paul C. Weiler, Governingthe Workplace: Employee Representationin the
Eyes of the Law, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 81, 87 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993).
222. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 208, at S-14. Under this proposal,
workplaces that have approved safety and health programs in place would get
preferential OSHA treatment. See id. One concern with preferential treatment is that
it seems to move too much toward the proposals advanced by Kniesner & Leeth. See
discussion supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
223. See John Zalusky, The Worker Views the Enforcement of Safety Laws, 26 LAB.
L.J. 224, 225 (1975).
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apparent reason why an entrenched safety committee cannot
use the same strategy.
2. Employee ParticipationUnder WARNA-While OSHA
envisions a role for any representative of employees, only a
union has authority under WARNA to receive notice for all
employees and to sue on their behalf.22 4 Thus, another
potential reform under WARNA is to expand the statutory
definition of "representative" beyond labor unions. An
established representative is crucial because it may be easier
for aggrieved non-employees to organize a class action when
a group relationship and ongoing reliance on representatives
already exists. When groups of individuals have already
demonstrated a high level of commitment to workplace cooperation and involvement, those individuals will be more likely
to engage in further behavior oriented toward the good of the
entire group.2 2 5
3. Employee Participation Under FLSA-Participation
groups formed to deal with wage and hours under FLSA are
more problematic because they might fall directly under
prohibitions contained in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).2 26 Under section 8(a)(2), it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation
or administration of any labor organization, " 227 where "labor
organization" is defined as any organization or employee
representation committee that exists for the purpose of dealing
with employers concerning wages, rates of pay, or hours of
employment.22 8 If employee participation groups are prohibited
as an unfair labor practice, they cannot be used to improve
FLSA enforcement.
Not all participation groups, however, will run afoul of the
NLRA. If the group is run more like a traditional labor union,
where employees elect their own representatives and contribute the money necessary to keep the group financed, employer
interference will be absent and the group will avoid an unfair

224. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1994) (requiring that exclusive representatives must
be selected by a majority of employees in the unit they will represent); id.
§ 2101(a)(4) (defining "representative" as an exclusive representative within the
meaning of § 159(a)); id. § 1204(a)(5) (allowing a "representative" of employees to
enforce liability).
225. See Robertson & Tang, supra note 216, at 69.
226. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
227. Id. § 158(a)(2).
228. See id. § 152(5).

814

University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform

[VOL. 30:4

labor practice charge.2 2 9 It is likely that employees will set up
such independent organizations, because it appears that
workers express a high interest in having a say about issues
relating to wage and grievance resolution.2 3 °
The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor
has had some success with programs in which workplace
groups are responsible for assuring compliance with regulations. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Wage and Hour Division
operated a voluntary self-audit program known as Compliance
Utilizing Education (CUE). 23' The program involved training
seminars for company officials in personnel departments who
then verified company compliance with wage and hour laws.2 32
CUE proved successful but the program was terminated
because of the perception that the Wage and Hour Division
was shirking its enforcement duties.23 3 Nevertheless, this
example provides hope for future programs in which workplace
groups supplement agency enforcement.

D. Labor Unions

For a labor union to participate in collective bargaining, it
must first become the exclusive representative of a group of
employees. 23 4 To attain exclusive status, a labor organization
must gain the support of a majority of the employees it wishes
to represent. 235 As the exclusive bargaining representative, the
union can represent and bargain for all employees in that
unit, including employees that did not vote in favor of
representation.2 3 6 Unions provide a collective voice, allowing
workers to communicate with management.23 v

229. See generally Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1157-70 (7th Cir.
1994) (discussing and applying a two-prong test which requires that a participation
group be both a labor organization and be dominated, interfered with, or influenced
by the employer in order to be an unfair labor practice).
230. See KOCHAN, supra note 211, at 107, 111-12 (noting survey data which
suggests that a majority of workers in its sample want a substantial say over wage
and hour grievance procedures).
231. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 208, at S-62.
232. See id.
233. See id. at S-63.
234. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 23, at 8.
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When a union successfully obtains benefits from an
employer, those benefits apply to both union and nonunion
employees in the represented unit.2 3 ' Because such benefits

are collective gains for the entire workforce, there is incentive
for employees to remain nonunion and to free-ride on the
efforts of others.2 39 Free-riding may explain problems with low
membership and low involvement in union activities.
Legislators have attempted to respond to concerns about
free-riders. The National Labor Relations Act240 (NLRA)
permits unions and employers to agree to "union shop" clauses
requiring employees to become members of the union within
thirty days of being hired.24 ' Commentators argue such coercion is needed to enable unions to supply collective goods to
large groups.242
Despite the free-rider problem, workers do join unions and
serve as active members. The decision to participate depends
on how much the collective action will "cost" the individual
worker. 243 For example, showing up to a meeting may require
only one hour of time, whereas participating in an economic
strike could mean losing one's-job to a replacement worker.244

238. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
239. The free-rider problem is exacerbated as the union gets larger. The larger it
becomes, the less each individual's contribution will have an effect and the less the
absence of her contribution will be noticed. Therefore, the larger a union becomes,
"the less it will further its common interests." OLSON, supra note 11, at 36. In
addition, an individual sees her contribution as a less effective way of generating a
kind of quid pro quo among other members. See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 133
(arguing that as groups get larger, "the efficacy of contingent behaviors ... is likely
to decline").
240. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
241. See id. at § 158(a)(3) ("[Nlothing... shall preclude an employer from making
an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment or the effective date of such agreement .... "). It is permissible to
require "membership" only from a financial standpoint. See Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1953) (allowing "unions security agreements ... to compel
payment of union dues and fees"); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742
(1963) ("It is permissible to condition employment upon membership, but membership
... may in turn be conditioned only upon payments of fees and dues."); Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988) (noting that membership may
only be required in the form of financial support for "collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment").
242. See OLSON, supra note 11, at 71 (arguing that without compulsory membership and coercive picket lines, the individual has little incentive to join a union).
243. See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 15.
244. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 US. 333, 345-46 (1938) (holding
that employers can replace striking employees, and do not have to discharge the
replacements when strikers want to resume their employment).
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Cost must be considered in light of the potential benefits of
successful collective action. The value of collective action in
terms of costs and benefits varies depending on the circumstances of each situation. 245 But it seems clear that when the
union calls for a strike, higher participation increases the
pressure on the employer, thereby increasing workers' bargaining power and obtaining employer concession to more
demands. In this way, action by unions can improve enforcement of OSHA, WARNA, and FLSA.
1. Union Action Under OSHA-Because OSHA is best
enforced through collective action,24' a union is a natural
enforcement vehicle.2 4 v Studies show that OSHA enforcement
is significantly higher when there is a union in the
workplace.2 4 8
When a union is involved during the early stages of OSHA
enforcement, a union representative can file the formal complaint and protect employees from retaliation. 24 9 A union
presence adds protection over and above the confidentiality
provisions of OSHA. 25 ° The union's role becomes even more
crucial as time commitments and risks of retaliation increase
later in the process.
An important part of statutory enforcement is the physical
inspection done by the Secretary of Labor or his agent. Although OSHA provides an opportunity for a representative of
the employees to join the employer and inspector in the

245. See Elster, supra note 10, at 141.
246. See YATES, supra note 60, at 245.
247. See Patricia A. Greenfield & Robert J. Pleasure, Representativesof Their Own
Choosing: Finding Workers' Voice in the Legitimacy and Power of Their Unions, in
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 169, 171 (Bruce
E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (explaining that unions use collective
bargaining to establish grievance and arbitration procedures). Additional union
involvement in the enforcement of OSHA may be easier said than done. Lack of
government commitment and resources is one reason that American workers are still
injured and killed on the job. See Jefferson, supra note 46, at 47. Another is that
organized labor itself is "too busy fighting for its own life to fight for the lives of
workers." Id.
248. See David Weil, Enforcing OSHA- The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL.
20, 21 (1991). Additionally, the higher the percentage of unionized employees, the
higher the likelihood that an OSHA complaint will lead to an inspection. See id. at
26-27.
249. See LOFGREN, supranote 70, at 205 ("Unions can provide a shield for employees by presenting the health or safety concern to management and later if necessary
to OSHA. The union representative thus takes any 'heat.' ").
250. See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1994 & Supp. I 1995) (allowing employees
who request an inspection to have their names kept confidential).
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walk-around,251 one author has found that employees rarely
join the inspection when there is no union. 252 This is under-

standable because nonunion forms of employee representation
have several legal and practical limitations. 2" But, when a
representative of the employees is present during the
walk-around, the intensity of the inspection increases,25 4 which
may lead to better identification of safety hazards.2 55
Beyond filing complaints and participating in walk-arounds,
the presence of a union increases access to health and safety
information; employers are required to provide unions with
such information for collective bargaining purposes. 25" The
union can utilize the information, in conjunction with scientific
studies it collects, to "form the basis for a rank-and-file education campaign. " "' Itseems highly unlikely that one individual
would have the incentive or the bargaining power to collect
and organize the amount of information necessary to educate
the entire workforce as the union does.

One benefit of a better informed workforce is increased
individual participation resulting from increased awareness of
the filing procedures. 5 8 Another is an increased ability to
provide substantive assistance to the inspector's investigation.25 9 One author has found that union representatives often

251. See OSHA § 657(e).
252. Summers, supra note 51, at 502. The statute seems to anticipate employee

involvement even in the absence of union representation. A "representative authorized by [the] employees ... [may] accompany the Secretary.

.

. during the physical

inspection." OSHA § 657(e). Furthermore, "representative" is neither qualified by the
word "union" nor defined at all in the definition section of the statute. See id. § 652.
253. For a discussion on the employee participation alternative, see supra Part
III.C. Although unlikely, some nonunionized employees do select representatives. In
cases involving mine workers, employee representatives participate in walk-arounds
despite the absence of union representation. See, e.g., Magma Copper Co. v. Secretary
of Labor, 645 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981).
254. See Weil, supra note 248, at 28-30.
255. An interesting caveat must be addressed here. Surveys in the 1970s indicated
that some union representatives avoided participating in a walk-around for fear of
causing a plant closure and being responsible for lost jobs. See Zalusky, supra note
223, at 229. Although this fear is not quite part of the collective action problem, it
demonstrates an additional practical limitation on the effectiveness of union representatives.
256. See YATES, supra note 60, at 117-18. Also, employers generally must allow
union agents to enter plant premises when necessary to monitor health and safety
conditions. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Can Co., 924 F.2d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 1991).
257. YATES, supra note 60, at 244. Unions also institute health and safety programs that increase employee exercise of their rights by providing on-the-job risk
education and information about legal rights. See Weil, supra note 248, at 22.
258. See Weil, supra note 248, at 27 (explaining a study which demonstrates that
more employees file complaints when a union is present in the workplace).
259. See id. at 28.
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feel freer than nonunion members to express opinions to
inspectors.2 60 This may result from improved information,
better understanding of the importance of that information,
and confidence in increased protection from employer retaliation.
2. Union Action Under WARNA-In light of the collective
nature of rights protected by WARNA, future effectiveness of
the Act depends on a strong union role. The statute itself
recognizes the presence of a "representative of employees."26 '
Union importance under WARNA is enhanced because, in
comparison to OSHA and FLSA, no administrative agency has
tried to enforce the civil penalty provision in the statute.26 2
While agency action would probably be helpful in enforcing
WARNA because, as an external source of enforcement, it can
increase employees' willingness to act for the collective good,26 3
this has not occurred. If an agency were involved, an employee
could simply file a complaint and leave the investigation to
that agency, thus lowering the cost to the employee and
consequently raising her likelihood of acting.26 4 Under
WARNA, where there is no agency involvement, a union can
serve a similar function because it is a pre-existing organization with the time and resources to investigate the situation
and file a complaint on behalf of the employees it represents.
It appears that Congress contemplated this type of role for
unions by requiring employers to provide notice of mass layoffs
and plant closings to the union instead of to individual employees when a union exists. 265 Furthermore, the law is now
clear that under WARNA, a union representative has standing
to sue an employer for union members' damages without
joining individual employees.2 6

260. See LOFGREN, supra note 70, at 204.

261. WARNA, 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
262. See McHugh, supra note 105, at 67.
263. See HARDIN, supra note 11, at 50-53; see also supra Part III.B.1.
264. See supra Part III.B.1.
265. WARNA § 2102.
266. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group,
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1529, 1531 (1996). Brown argued that WARNA eliminates a union's
power to sue on behalf of its members because a union is not entitled to a penalty in
its own right. See id. at 1533. The Court rejected this argument. See id. As required
by the doctrine of associational standing: The union's members would have had
standing to sue on their own, the interests the union sought to protect were germane
to its purpose, and neither the claim nor the relief sought required individuals'
participation in the lawsuit. See id. at 1534.
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The ability of an association such as a union to bring a
lawsuit is an important method of enforcing collective rights.
In fact, the Supreme Court recognized that "the primary
reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with
others."2 " 7 In addition to the improved effectiveness of union
suits as compared to individual suits, representational lawsuits can also overcome collective action problems suffered by
class actions. First, once a pre-existing association such as a
union is in place, no particular employee needs to start the
process for everyone else. Second, an association "can draw
upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital."2 6 8
Finally, in addition to the role it plays when an employer
has already violated the act, a union presence may also prevent litigation by increasing employer compliance with
WARNA notice requirements. 26 9 During debates in the Senate
prior to passage of WARNA, Senator Metzenbaum argued that
"[it is the nonunion operations that fail to give adequate
notice, more then [sic] the union operations."2 7 °
3. Union Action Under FLSA-The current version of
FLSA limits the role of unions because the 1947 amendments 27' eliminated the provision allowing representational
suits. 272 This change closed one avenue through which unions
could address collective action problems. This is therefore a
crucial area of needed statutory reform-reinstatement of
representative actions by unions or any employee representative.
Despite repeal of union rights to sue on behalf of employees,
unions can still play a major role in successful lawsuits. The
union can become a crucial source of information. "The role of

267. International Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986). If one envisions a
labor union as having an identity separate from its individual members, see Feldman,
supra note 22, at 745, and a purpose directed at the association itself, then
associational standing makes sense on the ground that the union "seeks to protect
an interest that is identifiably collective and therefore not equivalent to any atomistic
interests." Id. at 749.
268. Brock, 477 U.S. at 289.
269. WARNA § 2102.
270. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 100TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
S. 2527, WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT 508 (Comm. Print

1990).
271. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Ch. 52, § 5, 61 Stat. 84, 87 (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994 & Supp. I 1995)).
272. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
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labor organizations would shift to one of providing advice and
assistance to individuals ... seeking unpaid wages or overtime pay . . .,273 Even a non-majority union can demonstrate
the benefits of a union presence by informing employees of
their individual employment rights and helping them enforce
those rights.2 74
Furthermore, the existence of a group representative may
increase employees' ability and willingness to begin a class
action.2 7 5 If employees feel empowered by the union's presence,
they may feel empowered to step forward and advance the
collective good. Especially in cases in which the employee
desires to continue her employment, the presence of the union
increases the chance that she will be able to do so without
retaliation.
A union presence may also facilitate agency enforcement at
a particular plant because the Department of Labor may
conduct more thorough investigations if a union is involved in
the process. One example of such investigations involved an
extensive investigation of Food Lion, a large supermarket
chain allegedly violating federal wage and hour laws. 276 The
Wage and Hour Division conducted fifty investigations from
1979 through 1990.277 Later, the union representing Food Lion
employees filed a supplemental complaint and provided the
agency with additional information regarding violations.2 7 The
agency addressed the union complaint and "had several meetings with [union] representatives to keep them apprised of the
progress" of the investigation.2 7 9 If there had been no union
assisting the employees and serving as a contact for the
agency, the investigation might not have been as thorough.

273. CRAVER, supra note 134, at 70; see also, Rabin, supra note 8, at 206-07
(proposing that unions could serve as a source of advice and guidance for individuals
regarding their private rights by charging a nominal fee). A union could also assist
the employee in preliminary fact-finding efforts. See id.
274. See Clyde Summers, Unions Without Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 531, 542-43 (1990). "When unions cannot represent employees for the
purpose of collective bargaining, non-majority unions can represent employees for the
protection of individual employment rights." Id. at 545. Despite Summers' reference
to "individual employee rights," many of the rights that unions can help enforce most
effectively are in fact collective rights.
275. See supra Part III.A (discussing class actions as enforcers of statutes).
276. See Enforcement Hearings, supra note 190, at 2.
277. See id. at 213.
278. See id. at 215.
279. Id.
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Finally, the concept of group action offers general protection
to employees who engage in concerted activity. The presence
of a union supporting an employee's assertions of her rights
transforms the individual's complaint into "concerted
activity."28 In fact, even in the absence28of
exclusive represen1
available.
still
are
tation, other rights

CONCLUSION

The need to improve enforcement of worker rights legislation
is clear, but the best method to do so is unclear. The most
effective reform would involve including provisions in OSHA,
WARNA, and FLSA allowing class actions, expanding agency
involvement, and creating roles for employee representatives,
either through unions or otherwise. Overall, strengthening the
roles available to employee participation groups may be the
most productive route in light of diminishing union membership.
This Note proposes formalizing this alternative. First,
Congress should amend OSHA and define "representative" in
a way that provides a method for electing a representative.
Second, representational suits should be reintroduced into
FLSA, allowing a representative of aggrieved employees to
bring suit for the collective group. Third, the definition of
representative in WARNA should be expanded beyond unions
to include employee participation groups. The availability of
an administrative structure would assist employees in mobilizing for collective action in the first instance. Employee
participation groups can best advance the collective interests
of employees and obtain public goods that individuals desire
but lack the incentive to obtain.

280.

Summers, supra note 274, at 542 (noting that unions can provide a "shield

of 'concerted activity' ").
281. See id. at 531; see also Liberty Natural Prod., Inc. v-NLRB, Nos. 94-70489,
94-70619, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38232 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.

Ct. 2528 (1996) (holding that a nonunionized company violated the NLRA by firing
two employees after they drew up a petition complaining about low wages and late
paychecks); supra Part III.C (discussing a similar role played by employee participation groups).

